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1 
A Realistic Version of Campaign Finance Reform and Two Essential 
Steps Toward a Return to Effective Governance   
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1 
My main contribution to this symposium on “The Administration of Democracy” consists of a simple 
proposal to reform regulation of the process of financing a campaign for federal office. I urge Congress to 
eliminate most restrictions on contributions to campaigns and to impose on each campaign, political party 
and Political Action Committee (PAC) a duty to report every significant contribution publicly and promptly. 
Given the breadth of the topic of the symposium, however, I cannot resist the opportunity to urge two 
other changes in our methods of governance that I believe to be essential to any effort to return to the 
democratic system of government that we once enjoyed. Those changes are elimination of primaries as 
the means through which political parties nominate candidates for office and elimination of what has 
come to be known as “the Hastert rule” – the rule that prohibits consideration of a Bill by the full House 
of Representatives unless it is supported by a majority of the members of the caucus of the party that has 
a majority in the House. 
In section one I explain why it is impossible to implement a system of campaign finance reform that has 
any chance of furthering two of the potential goals of such a reform—taking money out of politics or 
creating conditions in which campaigns are fair to both candidates. In section two, I review and critique 
the main judicial decisions that have been issued in this area of law. I applaud the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the subject but express concern about one component of the D.C. Circuit’s approach. In 
section three, I describe my proposed changes in law. We should remove virtually all restrictions on 
1 Lyle. T. Alverson Professor of Law at George Washington University. 
2 
 
donations to the campaigns of candidates at the same time that we create a legal regime that insures that 
the public knows the source of all contributions within days after they have been received. Such a 
reformed system would decrease significantly the amount of irresponsible negative advertising in political 
campaigns and would allow each voter to decide whether to vote for a candidate who is supported by 
individuals the voter considers undesirable or untrustworthy.  
In section four, I explain why we must eliminate our reliance on primaries as a means of choosing 
candidates for office and abolish the Hastert rule if we want to return to the system of democratic 
governance that we once enjoyed. The combination of primaries and the Hastert rule creates a political 
environment that is controlled by a small minority of the electorate with views that are on the extreme 
right or extreme left of the political spectrum. That combination renders it impossible for members of 
Congress to make the compromises that are essential to the ability of Congress to engage in bi-partisan 
legislative action. It also threatens to create an environment in which no president can staff the executive 
branch or fill vacancies in the judicial branch.  
I. Some Potential Goals of Campaign Finance Reform are Unrealistic    
If you accept the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the First Amendment,2 as I do, it is impossible to 
create a system of campaign finance reform that will take money out of politics or that will create 
conditions in which elections are fair to each candidate. That explains why I propose a system that will 
further the more modest goals of reducing the amount of irresponsible negative advertising in campaigns 
and making the campaign finance system transparent so that voters can decide whether they want to 
support a candidate who takes money from individuals they dislike or distrust. Pursuit of those goals poses 
major challenges but I think they are plausible goals.     
                                                          
2 E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (!976). 
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I will emphasize one feature of our campaign finance regulatory system to illustrate the basis for my 
beliefs—the choice of decision making structure for the Federal Election Commission (FEC). When 
Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, it chose an unusual structure for the newly-
created Federal Election Commission (FEC), the agency that is responsible for implementing the Act. The 
FEC was to consist of six voting members. Two members were to be nominated by the President subject 
to confirmation by both the Senate and the House, while two were to be appointed by the Speaker of the 
House and two were to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate.3  
The legislative history of the Act confirms the obvious. Congress chose this structure because legislators 
assumed that every appointee will vote in accordance with the preferences of the politician who appoints 
the member and that every politician who appoints a member has an interest in his election or re-election 
that exceeds the politician’s interest in any other issue.4 Thus, the members of the House and Senate 
feared that giving the president the sole role in nominating members of the FEC would create an agency 
that was biased in favor of the president and candidates for the House and Senate that the President 
preferred.  
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court called those fears “rational” and expressed its sympathy for “this sentiment 
as a practical matter.”5 Yet, the Court held the structure of the FEC in the statute unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Appointments Clause.6 The FEC members are Officers of the United States who can only 
be appointed through the process of nomination by the president subject to confirmation by the Senate.  
The Court stayed its opinion for thirty days to allow Congress to amend the Act to conform it to the 
requirements of the Appointments Clause. 7 
                                                          
3 Id. at 126-27. 
4 Id. at 134. 
5 Id. at 134. 
6 Id. at 140-42. 
7 Id. at 144. 
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Congress responded to the Court’s decision by amending the Act to comply with the Appointments Clause. 
As amended, the Act gave the president the power to nominate each of the six voting members of the 
FEC, subject to confirmation by the Senate.8 The amended statute coupled that constitutionally-required 
change with three other features that reflected the continuing belief of members of Congress that FEC 
members will act in accordance with the biases of the politician who appointed the member. First, 
Congress retained the unique even-number of Commissioners structure despite its obvious disadvantage 
of inviting impotence attributable to frequent tie votes. Second, Congress provided that no more than 
three of the six Commissioners can be members of the same political party. Third, Congress mandated 
that the FEC must include the Secretary of the Senate or his designee and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives or his designee as non-voting members.  
In FEC v. NRA Victory Fund,9 the D.C. Circuit refused to decide whether the no-more-than-three-members 
of the same political party restriction on the president’s appointment power is unconstitutional. It 
concluded that the question is not justiciable except in the unlikely event that the president nominates 
and the Senate confirms four Commissioners who are members of the same party.10 The court held 
unconstitutional the provision that required the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate to be 
non-voting members.11 The court concluded that, since the non-voting members would influence the 
FEC’s decisions, they too were Officers of the United States who could only be appointed through the 
process of nomination by the president and confirmation by the Senate. The court rejected the 
government’s argument that the non-voting members would not be able to influence the decisions of the 
FEC because the only plausible reason Congress required their inclusion on the FEC was the expectation 
that they would influence the decisions of the FEC. 
                                                          
8 2 U.S.C. §437c(a)(1) (1988).  
9 6 F. 3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994).  
10 Id. at 824-25. 
11 Id. at 826-27. 
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As amended by Congress and qualified by the D.C. Circuit, the FEC typically consists of three Republicans 
and three Democrats, each of whom was nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.    That 
structure creates a predictable systemic problem. The FEC has little practical power because it frequently 
divides equally on straight party lines.12  
Congress was so confident that the FEC members would act on the basis of the motives of the politicians 
who appointed them that it included in the statute unusual provisions that reflect that belief.  The statute 
authorizes courts to review FEC decisions not to act 13 and it authorizes citizen suits to enforce the statute 
when the FEC fails to act within 120 days of the filing of a complaint at the FEC.14 The congressional 
decision to include those provisions in the Act reinforce my belief that the FEC’s dearth of practical power 
was an anticipated and intended effect of the structure Congress chose. 
Given the universally shared belief that the head or heads of the FEC will act in accordance with the 
preferences of the politicians who appoint them, it is easy to conclude that the FEC structure Congress 
chose is better than the alternatives. If the FEC was headed by a single individual nominated by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate, the agency would be controlled by one of the two political parties 
during periods in which the Senate is controlled by the president’s party. During such a period, the FEC 
would make all decisions in ways that would benefit the president’s party and disadvantage the opposing 
party. If Congress had chosen the structure that is common for other multi-member agencies—five 
members, no more than three of whom can be members of the same party, it would be easy to predict 
the same result except that the decisions would be three-to-two in favor of the president’s party.  
                                                          
12 See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 923 F. 3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Pillard, 
dissenting from decision to deny rehearing en banc.)  
13 52 U.S.C. §30109(a)(8)(A). 
14 52 U.S.C. §30109(a)(8)(C). 
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During periods in which the Senate is not controlled by the president’s party, the FEC would often be 
powerless if it was structured in either of those traditional ways. As a result of predictable impasses 
between the president and the Senate in the appointment process, it would often be headless if it was 
headed by a single person and it would often lack a quorum if it was headed by five Commissioners. 
Many observers of the FEC express dismay that it so often divides evenly on party lines. I would be more 
concerned if I saw a change from that pattern of decisions to a pattern in which the FEC decides many 
cases unanimously. I can imagine only two circumstances in which the FEC would decide lots of cases 
unanimously. That could happen as a result of capture of the FEC by a political party. That would make 
the agency an arm of one party—a result far worse than impotence.  
The other possible cause of such a change is a situation in which all of the politicians who have roles in 
appointing FEC members share a common interest. They have a common interest in only one important 
context. They are all incumbents so they have a common interest in making decisions that favor 
incumbents. The FEC commissioners of both parties are likely to agree to make any decision that benefits 
incumbents and handicaps challengers. I would not consider that change from the status quo to be 
socially-beneficial. 
The politicians who enact statutes that regulate contributions to campaigns share an interest in crafting 
rules that favor incumbents. It is easy to disguise rules that favor incumbents as even-handed rules that 
seem to enhance fairness. The statutory limits on campaign contributions appear to be fair and even-
handed because they impose the same limits on contributions to the campaigns of all candidates. That 
appearance is misleading, however. “Even-handed” statutory limits on campaign contributions create a 
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systemic bias in favor of incumbents. It is more difficult, and more expensive, for a challenger to run a 
successful campaign than for an incumbent to run a successful campaign.15  
I am confident that the politicians who voted for the contribution limits did so with full knowledge that 
the limitations have the effect of increasing the advantages that they, as incumbents, enjoy in all elections. 
Thus, the most basic characteristic of any system of regulating campaign finance—even-handed limits on 
the contributions that can be made to each candidate—is inconsistent with pursuit of the goal of 
regulating campaign finance to create a level playing field for each candidate. Campaign finance limits 
would create a level playing field only if incumbents were subject to much lower limits on campaign 
contributions than challengers—a form of campaign finance reform that no incumbent would support.         
Some people might label my pessimistic perspective on the prospects for socially beneficial regulation of 
campaign finance as cynical. I prefer to think of it as realistic. It is no more cynical than the beliefs of the 
politicians who participated in the process of deciding how to structure the leadership of the FEC. Every 
decision Congress made in that process reflects the belief of politicians that they and their appointees will 
act in their own best interests as politicians who value re-election more than anything else. 
II. Constitutional Limits on the Power of Congress to Regulate Campaign Finance 
In its controversial decision in Citizens United v. FEC,16 a five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court held 
that Congress cannot limit the contributions that corporations and labor unions can make to political 
campaigns. My views on the potential good or bad effects of campaign finance regulation do not depend 
on whether the majority or dissent got the better of that argument. 
                                                          
15 There is a rich scholarly literature that documents the advantages that incumbents enjoy in elections. E.g., 
Stephen Ansolabehere & James Snyder, The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and 
Federal Offices, 1942-2000, Election Law Journal Vol. 1, No. 3 (2002).  
16 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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My views have been influenced by the holdings of the Supreme Court in Buckley and of the D.C. Circuit in 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC.17 In its per curiam opinion in Buckley, the Supreme Court provided a good summary 
of its substantive holdings: 
In summary, we sustain the individual contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provisions, 
and the public financing scheme. We conclude, however, that the limitations on campaign 
expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and on expenditures by a 
candidate from his personal funds are constitutionally infirm.18 
In its opinion in SpeechNow, the D.C. Circuit relied on the reasoning in Buckley as the basis for its holding 
that Congress cannot limit contributions to, or spending by, independent-expenditure-only political action 
committees.19        
I agree with the holdings in Buckley and SpeechNow, but they create two practical problems. First, they 
provide an advantage to super rich candidates for office who can self-fund a campaign. Second, they 
create a powerful incentive to rely primarily on political action committees (PACs) and super PACs as the 
source of most of the money to finance a campaign and most of the advertisements to support candidates. 
Individual contributions to campaigns for candidates are subject to a relatively low ceiling-- $2800 per 
person at present.20  Political parties that operate independently of candidates can contribute to 
campaigns of candidates. Both individual contributions to the party and contributions of the party to a 
candidate are subject to a ceiling that is only slightly higher than the ceiling on individual’s contributions 
to the campaign of a candidate--$5000.21 PACs can support a candidate for office but cannot be affiliated 
                                                          
17 599 F. 3d 686 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 562 U.S. 1003 (2010).    
18 424 U.S. at 143. 
19 599 F. 3d at 692-94. 
20 52 U.S.C. §30116a(1)(A). 
21 52 U.S.C. §30116a(1)(C).  
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with the campaign of the candidate and must operate independently of the candidate. PACs can 
contribute up to $5000 to a candidate. 
“Super PAC” is a term that refers to an independent-expenditure-only committee.22 Like a PAC, a super 
PAC cannot be affiliated with a campaign for a candidate and must operate independently of such a 
campaign. Contributions to a super PAC are not, and cannot be, limited. Super PACs account for a large 
and rapidly growing proportion of the money that is now spent in federal elections.23 In ___, super PACs 
spent 84% of their money in support of incumbents. Ten super PACs accounted for 75% of total spending 
by super PACs. Most super PACs are supported by one or a few extremely rich individuals, many of whom 
contribute over a millions dollars to a single super PAC. Thus, for instance, a single donor gave $78 million 
to super PACs associated with Republican candidates in 2016;24 a single donor gave $20 million to the 
super PAC associated with Donald Trump’s campaign;25 85% of the money raised by the super PAC 
associated with Hillary Clinton’s campaign came from donors who contributed at least one million 
dollars;26 and the top 1% of donors to super PACs in 2015-16 accounted for 89% of all individual 
contributions to super PACs. 27 
In section I, I explained why campaign finance reform cannot create an election process that is fair to all 
candidates—any politically viable system will increase the advantages that incumbents have over 
challengers.  Proponents of campaign finance reform often express a desire to further another goal—to 
take money out of politics. That is impossible if you accept, as I do, the holdings of Buckley and SpeechNow. 
Any attempt to limit the role of money in political campaigns through means such as limits on 
                                                          
22 Congressional Research Service, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for 
Congress 6-7 (Dec. 13, 2018).  
23 Miriam Galston, Buckley 2.0: How Would the Buckley Court Decide Buckley Today? forthcoming in Penn. J. Con. 
L. ___ (2019). 
24 Galston, note __ supra., at __. 
25 Id. at ___. 
26 Id. at ___. 
27 Id. at ___. 
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contributions to campaigns and political parties will have only the effect of redirecting contributions from 
candidate campaigns to Super PACs.  
Two other court opinions are important to my proposed method of reforming campaign finance reform. 
In FEC v. Akins,28 the Supreme Court held that Congress created a right to obtain information about 
political campaigns when it enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act and that any citizen has standing 
to challenge any action that the FEC takes that arguably interferes with that right.  However, in Citizens 
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC,29 the D.C. Circuit undermined the effect of the holding 
in Akins by holding that many important FEC decisions cannot be reviewed by a court. In the next section 
of this essay I will explain why the holding in Akins is critical to my reform proposal and why the holding 
in Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington would render my proposal ineffective. 
III. Congress Should Deregulate Contributions to the Campaigns of Candidates and Require Prompt 
Public Disclosure of All Contributions to Any Political Committee 
My proposed reform of campaign finance is simple. Congress should repeal all limits on contributions to 
candidate campaigns and require all campaigns, political parties, PACs and super PACs to report all 
significant contributions promptly. Eliminating ceilings on contributions to candidate campaigns would 
encourage candidates to refocus their fund-raising efforts from super PACS to candidate campaigns. Over 
time, contributors would respond by shifting a high proportion of their contributions from PACs and super 
PACs to candidate campaigns. That would significantly improve the campaign finance system.          
The constitution forbids Congress to limit contributions to super PACs. The absence of limits on 
contributions to super PACs, combined with the limits on contributions to the campaigns of candidates, 
creates a campaign finance system in which a large and growing proportion of the money contributed 
                                                          
28 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
29 892 F. 3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2018), rehearing en banc denied, 923 F.3d 1141 (2019). 
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goes to super PACs and a high proportion of political advertising is sponsored by super PACs. That is 
undesirable for several reasons. 
First, advertisements sponsored by super PACs are less accurate and more negative than advertisements 
sponsored by candidates. Candidates must take responsibility for the advertisements they sponsor. They 
face a significant risk that an advertisement will backfire and hurt them if the public perceives it either as 
inaccurate or as unduly negative.30 Super PACs do not have to be concerned about either effect. A Super 
Pac can engage in inaccurate negative advertising without any concern that the candidate it supports will 
suffer any adverse effects.     
The different incentives of super PACs and candidates have massive effects on the types of advertisements 
each sponsors. Almost all of the positive advertisements—85 per cent on average—are candidate-
sponsored ads.31 By contrast advertisements by super PACs are overwhelmingly negative—93 per cent 
were negative in 2010.32  
Irresponsible and inaccurate negative advertisements have a systemic corrosive effect on public 
confidence in our political leaders. Many voters believe the claims that are made about opposing 
candidates in negative advertisements.33 Since super PACs that support each candidate sponsor many 
inaccurate negative ads, the winner of any election enters office with an undeserved bad reputation for 
honesty and integrity created by the negative advertisements sponsored by the super PACs that 
supported the opposing candidate. Eliminating the limits on contributions to candidate campaigns will 
reduce the amount of negative advertising and will increase the positive advertising by a corresponding 
amount. That will transform the political environment. Each successful candidate will enter office with a 
                                                          
30 P.Motta & Erika Franklin Fowler, Content and Effect of Political Advertising in U.S. Campaigns, Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics (Dec. 2016).    
31 Id. at p.9. 
32 Id. at p.9. 
33 Id. at p.15-16. 
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much better reputation for honesty and integrity. That, in turn, will increase public confidence in 
government.         
Second, it is virtually impossible for the FEC to enforce the prohibition on coordination between a 
campaign for a candidate and a super PAC that supports a candidate.34 It is common place, for instance, 
for a super PAC and a campaign to have officers, consultants, pollsters, and advertising firms in common.35 
It is impossible to insure that the firms and individuals who work for the campaign do not communicate 
and coordinate with themselves in their capacities as employees and agents for the super PAC. As a result, 
candidates can use super PACs to take many actions that they dare not take directly. 36 
Third, it is easier to enforce reporting and disclosure requirements against campaigns for candidates than 
against super PACs. That relates logically to the other half of my proposed reform. Congress should amend 
the election laws in ways that require all organizations that play a role in politics to report all significant 
contributions promptly. 
A comprehensive reporting and disclosure requirement would enable voters to learn who is supporting 
each candidate’s campaign for office. A candidate could obtain advantages in the election by boasting 
about the sources of funding she is foregoing and by criticizing her opponent for taking money from 
questionable sources. That provides the public with the opportunity to decide whether it wants to elect a 
candidate who receives funding from sources the public dislikes or distrusts.         
The Federal Election Campaign Act requires all candidates, political parties, PACs and super PACS to report 
the contributions they receive within ten days of receipt.37 However, the rules governing disclosure 
                                                          
34 Galston, supra. note __, at ___. 
35 Id. at ___. 
36 Id. at ___. 
37 52 U.S.C. §30104. 
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provide opportunities for evasion that are used routinely to enable candidates to hide sources of funding 
that the public dislikes or distrusts. 
Miriam Galston has documented the methods that are regularly used to avoid disclosure of the identities 
of contributors whose support would elicit negative reactions from voters.38 They include disclosing 
incomplete or misleading names of donors and purchasing advertisements on credit, thereby delaying the 
duty to report the contributions used to repay the loans until after the election. Many of the evasions are 
facilitated by the laws governing organizations that are exempt from taxes.39  
Social welfare organizations are exempt from taxes under IRC §501(c)(4) as long as they do not devote 
too much of their revenue to political causes. As interpreted by IRS, §501(c)(4) permits a social welfare 
organization to contribute up to 49 per cent of its expenditures to political activities, including 
contributions to super PACs.40 Exempt organizations are not required to report the identity of their 
contributors. As a result, individuals can evade the reporting system by donating to an exempt 
organization that, in turn, donates to a super PAC that supports a candidate. 
Individuals who want to evade the reporting system also can take advantage of the tax exempt 
organization loophole in another way. They can create an exempt organization just before an election and 
use it as a conduit for making unlimited contributions to super PACs.41 By the time that IRS discovers that 
the organization has violated the limits on its political activities, the election is over. 
Hundreds of millions of dollars in donations and hundreds of major donors escape the duty to report 
through use of these mechanisms in each election cycle. My proposal depends critically on the willingness 
                                                          
38 Galston, supra. note ___, at __.  
39 Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 53 Exempt Org. T. 
Rev. 165 (2006). For updates see Galston, supra. note ____, at __. See also Congressional Research Service: 501(c) 
Groups and Campaign Spending (Oct. 18, 2018).         
40 Galston, supra. note ___, at ___. 
41 Galston, supra. note ___, at ___.  
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of Congress to eliminate the many methods through which donors and candidates now evade the duty to 
report donations promptly. Professor Galston has described in detail the combination of actions that 
Congress must take to accomplish that result.42 
The predictable impotence of the FEC is another obstacle to the efficacy of my proposal. The FEC is highly 
likely to refuse to enforce the reporting and disclosure requirements by declining to act in response to 
complaints of violations, often by 3 to 3 votes. The FEC’s reluctance to enforce the reporting and disclosure 
requirements can be overcome by taking two steps. First, Congress must use extremely clear language in 
describing the duties to report and to disclose in order to empower courts to force the FEC to do its duty. 
Congress cannot trust the FEC to adopt interpretations of ambiguous statutory language that further the 
goal of insuring that all contributions are reported and disclosed promptly.43       
Second, courts must open their doors to challenges to the FEC when it refuses to comply with the statute. 
The Supreme Court took an important step in the right direction in its decision in FEC v. Akins.44 The Court 
held that any citizen has standing to obtain review of any FEC decision that has the effect of violating the 
statutory right of the citizen to know who is contributing to political campaigns and organizations.  
The D.C. Circuit took a step in the wrong direction in Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
v. FEC.45 The court held that courts cannot review 3-to-3 FEC decisions that refuse to initiate an 
enforcement proceeding in response to a complaint that some individual or entity violated the election 
laws. If courts refuse to review such decisions there is no realistic possibility that we can have any effective 
regulation of campaign finance, including my proposal to rely completely on transparency. Given the 
                                                          
42 Id. at ___, Galston, supra. note ___, at ___. 
43 While there are many points of disagreement about the extent of deference that a reviewing court should 
accord an agency’s interpretation of the text of any legal document, there is unanimity that the starting point 
always is whether the statute or rule that is being interpreted is clear or ambiguous. If a statute or rule is clear, an 
agency interpretation is entitled to no deference. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. ___, ___ (2019); Chevron v. NRDC, 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984).       
44 524 U.S. 11. 
45 892 F. 3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2018), rehearing en banc denied, 923 F.3d 1141 (2019). 
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composition of the FEC and the biases of its members, it is easy to predict that the FEC will refuse to 
enforce the law by a 3-to-3 vote in many cases in which the violation of law is clear.  
I am encouraged by the separate opinions of two D.C. Circuit judges in response to the circuit’s decision 
not to grant rehearing en banc. One judge dissented in a lengthy opinion in which he explained in detail 
why courts should review all 3-to-3 FEC decisions in which the FEC declines to take an enforcement 
action.46 Another judge wrote a concurring opinion in which he acknowledged the need to address that 
issue in a future case but expressed the view that the facts and briefing of the present case made it a poor 
vehicle for addressing reviewability.47 
 I recognize that the full transparency part of my proposal cannot be implemented unless Congress 
amends the laws applicable to reporting and disclosure and the courts enforce those laws when the FEC 
refuses to do so with a 3-to-3 vote. I believe that it is realistic to expect Congress to amend the statutes 
to create the potential for full transparency because members of Congress will not know whether such a 
change will help them or hurt them in the future. They will be acting behind the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance.48 I believe it is realistic to expect the courts to enforce the amended statute because I continue 
to have faith in the ability of life-tenured judges and Justices to enforce statutes in a manner that does 
not reflect partisan bias.         
IV. Other Proposals to Improve the Administration of Democracy                 
There are two other changes in the U.S. methods of implementing Democracy that I see as essential to 
restoration of a system of government that can function effectively. We must replace our present populist 
system of nominating candidates for office with a peer-based system, and both political parties must 
                                                          
46 923 F.3d 1141, 1143 (dissenting opinion of Judge Pillard). 
47 923 F. 3d 1141 (concurring opinion of Judge Griffith). 
48 John Rawls’ concept of the veil of ignorance and its critical role in decision making is described in Original 
Position, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Apr. 3, 2019).  
16 
 
abandon what is referred to as the Hastert rule—the rule that a majority of the members of the caucus of 
the party that controls the House must support a Bill before it can be the subject of a vote by the full 
House. 
There is broad agreement among scholars that our system of government has developed a major 
imbalance in the form of a transfer of undue power from the legislative branch to the executive branch.49 
The power of the executive has increased dramatically because of the growing impotence of the legislative 
branch.50 Congress is capable of legislating only during the brief periods in which one political party 
controls the House, the Senate and the Presidency. During all other periods of time legislative gridlock 
prevails and precludes Congress from enacting any meaningful legislation except on a short- term 
emergency basis. Congressional impotence creates a void that can only be filled by the executive branch. 
Congressional impotence is primarily a function of extreme and growing political polarity.51 Historians and 
political scientists have devoted a lot of time and energy to efforts to understand the complicated roots 
of that phenomenon. They have helped us understand why we have become so polarized but they have 
not yet identified any promising steps we can take to limit the increase in the political polarity of the 
electorate. That leaves us only with the option of trying to identify changes in our political institutions 
that have the potential to reduce the adverse effects of political polarity. 
Without major changes in the composition of our political institutions, the incentives of the members of 
Congress, and the voting rules of Congress, we will experience increasing adverse effects of the failure of 
our version of Democracy. As statutes become increasingly obsolete, the executive branch will have no 
                                                          
49 E.g., Jerry Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of 
Recent American Experience, 35 Yale J. on Reg. 549 (2018); Dan Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World 
of Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 137 (2014); Peter Strauss, Overseer or the Decider? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007).       
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choice but to try to stretch the power Congress has delegated to it in ways that put increased stress on 
the third branch—the judiciary. It is hard to see how judges can play constructive roles when they are 
regularly forced to choose between allowing the executive branch to exceed the boundaries of its 
delegated power and creating a situation in which no institution of government is capable of responding 
to the constantly changing needs of the nation. 
There is also broad agreement that the president has increased his personal political power to an 
undesirable degree.52 Traditionally many important executive branch decisions were made by agency 
heads who were nominated and confirmed as officers of the United States because of their expertise in 
the areas in which they made decisions. Over time that system of executive branch decision making has 
been replaced by a system in which many decisions are made by anonymous white house political 
operatives who have no subject matter expertise and are motivated solely by their desire to aid the 
president and his supporters.53 If left unchecked, increasing political polarity will accelerate the trend to 
replace the power of agencies headed by officers of the United States with the personal power of the 
president and anonymous white house aides.  
Officers of the United States, judges, and Justices can be appointed only through the process of 
nomination by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate.54 Confirmation votes have become 
increasingly partisan.55 With rare exceptions the members of the President’s party vote to confirm his 
nominees and the members of the opposition party vote against confirmation.  
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This increasing trend has the potential to produce disastrous results during the many periods in which the 
Senate is controlled by the opposition party. The president will not be able to choose people to head 
agencies. He will have no choice but to centralize power in the White House, with aides who have not 
been confirmed for any office exercising most of the power that agencies traditionally exercised.  
Increased political polarity can have similar devastating effects on the judiciary. During the many periods 
in which the White House and the Senate are controlled by different parties, the president will not be able 
to fill vacancies in the judiciary. A few years ago, I heard a scholar present a paper in which she discussed 
the serious problems that would exist if the Supreme Court no longer has the quorum that is required to 
make decisions. I was not concerned about the dysfunctional and impotent judicial branch she predicted 
as the result of such a situation because I believed that we would never find ourselves in that situation. I 
no longer discount that risk.  
The stakes are high. We must identify ways of encouraging legislators to engage in the kinds of 
compromises with each other and with the president that are essential to our ability to legislate and to 
staff the executive and judicial branches of government. We must find ways of changing the composition 
of the legislative branch that reduce the adverse effects of political polarity.  
The starting point should be the process of nominating candidates for office. Our present method of 
choosing candidates yields candidates who are not representative of the views of a majority of the 
members of either political party, at the same time that it discourages legislators from entering into the 
bipartisan negotiations that are essential to the compromises that can lead to legislation.56 
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Primaries are low turnout elections.57 The few voters who choose to participate are the most ideologically 
extreme members of the party.58 As a result Democratic primaries select the candidates who are furthest 
to the left and Republican primaries select the candidates who are furthest to the right. Primaries create 
a legislative body that is more polarized than the electorate. That greatly reduces the likelihood that the 
members of the House and Senate can reach agreement on a compromise.  
The primary process also greatly discourages members from compromising or even attempting to 
compromise. The vast majority of members represent districts or states that are “safe” in the sense that 
the candidate chosen by the member’s party is virtually certain to win the general election.59 The only 
threat to a Senator in a “safe” state or a Congressman in a “safe” district arises as a result of the primary 
process. If the member compromises or threatens to compromise by moving to the center, she is virtually 
certain to face a primary challenger who has an excellent chance of defeating the member by running to 
her left if she is a Democrat or to her right if she is a Republican. The risk of being “primaried” is the only 
realistic risk that a representative of a “safe” state or district confronts. She knows that risk increases if 
she moves toward the center to compromise, so her only safe course of action is to avoid all compromises 
and to take positions that are on the left end of the ideological spectrum if she is a Democrat and on the 
right end of the ideological spectrum if she is a Republican.60 
The alternative to party primaries are the methods that both political parties used in the U.S. until the 
1970s and that most of the world’s other Democracies use to choose candidates for office.61 The leaders 
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of the party choose the candidates based on a combination of a correspondence between the potential 
candidate’s values and the values of the party and an evaluation of the probability that the potential 
candidate will win the general election. Rick Pildes refers to these traditional methods of choosing 
candidates as peer-based.62  Since the dominant views of the electorate that participates in the general 
election are invariably near the right end of ideological spectrum of the members of the Democratic party 
and near the left end of the spectrum of the members of the Republican party, the party leaders have a 
powerful incentive to nominate centrists. The candidates who win the general election then have an 
incentive to take centrist positions on issues and to compromise with the members of the opposing party 
so that they can claim success in the legislative process. 
A House and Senate whose members are nominated through use of a peer-based method are far more 
likely to be able to make the bipartisan compromises that are essential to the process of enacting 
legislation. A Senate whose members are chosen through use of a peer-based system are also far more 
likely to be willing to engage in the compromises with the president that are essential to the process of 
choosing and confirming nominees to be Officers, Judges and Justices that are essential to the process of 
staffing the Executive and Judicial branches. 
Elimination of the “Hastert rule” is almost as important to our ability to function as a Democracy as 
elimination of party primaries. The Hastert rule prohibits the Speaker of the House from bringing any Bill 
to the floor for a vote unless a majority of the members of the Speaker’s caucus support the Bill.63 The 
Hastert rule has the effect of giving a minority of the members of the House the power to veto any Bill 
even if it would get a favorable vote from a majority of the members if it could make it to the floor for a 
vote. The majority of the members of the caucus (and minority of the members of the House) who have 
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this veto power are always the most far right members of the Republican caucus or the most far left 
members of the Democratic caucus. 
Elimination of the Hastert rule would be effective only if it is coupled with a new method of selecting the 
Speaker of the House. Bill Galston and the Problem Solvers Caucus of House Members that he advises 
have proposed a rule that would require a candidate for Speaker to obtain a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the House to be elected.64 That change in the composition of the electorate required to elect 
the Speaker would create an environment in which the Speaker is likely to be a centrist. The Speaker 
would then have a completely different set of incentives to determine the agenda of the House by 
allowing floor votes on Bills that have strong bipartisan support even if they are opposed by a majority of 
the members of the Speaker’s party.          
The combination of the primary process, the Hastert rule and the present method of electing the Speaker 
of the House produces a situation in which a minority of a minority can veto any Bill. The minority with 
the veto power lies on the far right fringe of the Republican party and the far left fringe of the Democratic 
party. If we eliminate both the primary process and the Hastert rule and change the method of choosing 
the Speaker, we will return to an institutional environment in which the members of both the House and 
the Senate are more representative of the views of a majority of the electorate and in which they are far 
more likely to be able to perform the critical tasks of enacting legislation and choosing the Officers who 
will make policy decisions in the Executive Branch and the Judges and Justices who will ensure that all of 
the political actors stay within the legal boundaries on their powers. 
I realize that the combination of changes that I urge have little chance of being adopted today. The 
prospects for their adoption will improve dramatically, however, when the disastrous consequences of 
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the status quo that I foresee become a reality so stark that the flaws in the characteristics of our present 
institutions cannot be ignored or denied.                
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